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Roundtable 
Ethical issues in the release of animals 
from captivity 
nimals have long been held in 
captivity for various pur- 
poses, most notably entertain- 
ment, education, research, and con- 
servation. The animal liberation and 
animal rights movements have in 
recent decades helped change the 
way people think about animals and 
about the way that animals should 
be treated. These efforts have led to 
a closer examination of the treat- 
ment of animals in captivity and to 
questions about the ethics of holding 
wild animals captive. Such exami- 
nations have led in turn to recent 
public and scientific interest in the 
possibility of releasing captive ani- 
mals back into the wild. For the 
general public, there is an intuitive 
appeal to an animal's living in the 
wild rather than in captivity. Rarely, 
however, is it an appeal informed by 
careful scientific or ethical analysis. 
The process of release and the rein- 
tegration of an animal into its native 
habitat is often not considered in 
detail, but is instead idealized and 
assumed to be necessarily successful. 
To address the ethics of release 
projects, it is necessary to define 
several important terms. We use the 
term release to refer to the place- 
ment of an animal, either born in 
captivity or captured and maintained 
in captivity for an extended time, 
into the wild where it is no longer 
under human care or supervision. 
Although each release project is likely 
to have its own criteria for success, 
we consider as successful those re- 
leases in which each released animal 
has fully integrated into a local wild 
population, is able to survive with- 
out further human aid, and no longer 
seeks interaction with humans. The 
term rehabilitation is often used to 
describe the treatment of wild ani- 
mals found injured or ill, taken into 
captivity until restored to full health, 
and then returned to the wild. We do 
not discuss releases subsequent to 
rehabilitation efforts, because the 
time spent recuperating in captivity 
is usually minimal and rarely results 
in the loss of survival skills. For the 
purposes of this article, rehabilita- 
tion will instead refer to the retrain- 
ing program used to prepare captive 
animals for release. 
There are four principal grounds 
for the release of captive animals: a 
lack of sufficient space in captive 
facilities due to overly successful 
breeding programs; the closure of 
facilities for financial or other rea- 
sons; pressure from animal libera- 
tion or other groups for the release 
of captive animals (although it is 
also feasible that a holding facility 
might decide independently to adopt 
the principles of such groups); and 
to aid the conservation of endan- 
gered species. An example encom- 
passing the first two grounds is the 
release of nine bottlenose dolphins 
from Atlantis Marine Park in West- 
ern Australia in 1991 (Gales and 
Waples 1993). An overly successful 
breeding program, combined with 
changes to government regulations 
on holding facilities, necessitated the 
construction of a new dolphin enclo- 
sure. This requirement compounded 
preexisting financial problems, and 
the park was forced to close. An 
example of the third ground is the 
"Free Willy" campaign, in which 
animal activist organizations have 
pursued the release of captive killer 
whales. At least two individual killer 
whales, the animal depicted in the 
movie "Free Willy" (Keiko, currently 
held in a dedicated facility in Or- 
egon) and one held in an aquarium 
in Florida (Lolita), have been tar- 
geted by the campaign, and public 
pressure has been applied to encour- 
age their release. 
Most release projects to date have, 
however, arisen out of a concern for 
the conservation of endangered spe- 
cies. Many conservation projects, 
involving a variety of bird and mam- 
mal species, have contributed to the 
scientific data available for estab- 
lishing guidelines and determining 
protocol for future release efforts. 
(Reports on specific release projects 
include: primates-Aveling and 
Mitchell 1982, Beck et al. 1991, 
Borner 1985, Kleiman et al. 1984; 
canids-Fritts et al. 1985, Moore 
and Smith 1991; birds-Ounsted 
1991, Toone and Wallace 1992; and 
ungulates-Gordon 1991. Reviews 
that compare and contrast multiple 
release projects include: birds and 
mammals-Ludwig and Mikolaja- 
czaks 1985, Stanley Price 1991, 
Wilson and Stanley Price 1992; pri- 
mates-Hannah and McGrew 1991, 
Konstant and Mittermeier 1982; and 
captive-born animals-Beck et al. 
1994). These projects have typically 
involved breeding animals in captiv- 
ity for future release, translocating 
animals from an area where the spe- 
cies is abundant to one where it was 
once common but is now scarce, or 
reintroducing captive animals into a 
habitat once occupied by the spe- 
cies. 
Although each of these justifica- 
tions for release projects is worthy 
of close ethical analysis, we focus 
instead on how release projects 
should be conducted. The question 
is not "when should animals be re- 
leased?" or even "is it always better 
to release animals than to euthanize 
them?" but "what are the duties of 
humans toward animals that are to 
be released?" We focus on the ethi- 
cal issues relevant to the planning of 
a rehabilitation and release project 
and contend that animals deserve 
moral consideration and that hu- 
mans, as moral agents, have respon- 
sibilities to them. These responsi- 
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bilities include the duty to not kill 
animals for trivial reasons and the 
duty to not cause animals unneces- 
sary suffering. We argue that animal 
caretakers have particular ethical 
duties to captive animals made de- 
pendent on human care and that 
these duties extend to those propos- 
ing and implementing release 
projects. These duties continue until 
a released animal is self-sufficient, a 
fact that highlights the importance 
of responsible selection of release 
candidates, of planning and imple- 
mentation of the rehabilitation pro- 
cess, and of postrelease monitoring 
and assessment. We describe factors 
that increase the likelihood of 
postrelease survival and strongly rec- 
ommend their consideration in fu- 
ture release projects. 
The responsibilities 
of caretakers 
To argue that there are compelling 
reasons for humans to care for ani- 
mals in the process of release, it is 
necessary first to establish that there 
is some human responsibility toward 
animals at all. It is generally ac- 
cepted that moral consideration is 
owed by all humans to other hu- 
mans. That is, there are certain re- 
sponsibilities that each one of us 
owes to other humans, such as the 
responsibility to not kill or cause 
unnecessary suffering (or at least, to 
not do so without some powerful 
justification). These responsibilities 
are held toward all humans, includ- 
ing those who cannot speak for them- 
selves or lack rational abilities (e.g., 
infants and the mentally infirm), 
because they protect or further the 
basic needs and desires-or inter- 
ests-of each individual. But ani- 
mals, too, have such interests. If one 
accepts the moral and communal 
significance of interests, there is no 
ethically relevant reason for distin- 
guishing the scope of moral concern 
to include humans but exclude ani- 
mals. 
Establishing the moral importance 
of interests is considered by many 
philosophers as a key to developing 
a more satisfactory ethical relation- 
ship between human and nonhuman 
animals. But this task need not in- 
volve a consensus as to why interests 
are of such foundational importance. 
For example, three prominent phi- 
losophers whose work has largely 
shaped recent research and debate in 
animal ethics-Bernard Rollin, Pe- 
ter Singer, and Tom Regan-take 
quite distinctive approaches. 
In Animal Rights and Human 
Morality, Rollin (1992) argues that 
the key to creating a consensus ethi- 
cal ideal for the treatment of ani- 
mals lies in the existence of a con- 
sensus social ethical ideal for the 
treatment of humans in society. 
Humans readily extend moral con- 
sideration to other humans, and they 
consequently recognize and abide 
by the associated responsibilities and 
duties. This conception of moral 
concern and consequent duties, he 
contends, can serve as a guide to the 
duties and responsibilities owed to 
other beings of moral standing, be- 
cause "if we can find no morally 
relevant differences between humans 
and animals, and if we accept the 
idea that moral notions apply to 
humans, it follows that we must 
rationally extend the scope of moral 
concern to animals" (Rollin 1992, 
p. 30). 
The usual ground for excluding 
animals from moral concern lies in 
the genetic, psychophysiological, and 
sociobiological differences between 
human and nonhuman animals. But 
Rollin argues that because none of 
these differences is morally relevant, 
they cannot justify the exclusion. 
Even the capacity to experience plea- 
sure and pain (which is sometimes 
used to include animals within the 
scope of ethical consideration) is an 
inadequate ground for attributing 
moral concern. Rollin argues instead 
that "what makes something fall 
within the scope of moral concern of 
a being capable of moral action is 
the presence of needs, desires, goals, 
aims, wants, or, more generally, in- 
terests which that being has and 
which a being capable of moral ac- 
tion can help, ignore or hinder" 
(Rollin 1992, p. 71). The needs of 
animals fall in the category of inter- 
ests, he contends, because the needs 
in question "matter" to the animal. 
Rollin considers this to be sufficient 
reason for animals to receive moral 
consideration. 
An argument for the extension of 
some moral standing to animals can 
also be found in the work of Singer 
(1993), whose position is founded 
on the principle of equality. This 
principle extends to all humans an 
equal consideration of their inter- 
ests despite otherwise vast differ- 
ences between them. Singer asserts 
that the principle of equality "pro- 
vides a basis that can't be limited to 
humans" (Singer 1993). He argues 
that if application of the principle 
cannot reasonably depend on differ- 
ences in intelligence, race, or ability, 
then neither should it depend on 
species. According to Singer, the 
capacity for suffering and enjoyment 
is a necessary and sufficient condi- 
tion for one's having interests, so 
that "if a being suffers, there can be 
no moral justification for refusing to 
take that suffering into consider- 
ation.... The principle of equality 
requires that the suffering be counted 
equally with the like suffering of any 
other being" (Singer 1993, p. 57). 
He consequently takes this capacity 
to be the only defensible boundary 
of concern for the interests of others. 
Because such a capacity is shared by 
at least all sentient beings, the prin- 
ciple of equality demands the ethical 
consideration of many animals 
(Singer 1989). 
Yet another approach is taken by 
Regan (1989), who critiques the 
understanding of the moral status of 
animals adopted by those who deny 
the existence of animal rights. 
Contractarianism and utilitarianism, 
for example, fail to account for the 
inherent value of the individual. 
Regan insists that not only do all 
humans have inherent value and that 
all who have inherent value have it 
equally, but that this value is the 
basis of an individual's "rights," 
which, he argues, stand behind each 
person's moral duties to others. 
Excluding animals from the scope 
of moral concern on the basis of 
their differences from humans is 
again shown to be untenable. As 
Regan points out, there are more 
basic similarities between humans 
and nonhuman animals than differ- 
ences, so that animals, too, must 
have inherent value. The similarity 
of greatest importance is that "we 
are each of us the experiencing sub- 
jects of a life, a conscious creature 
having an individual welfare that 
has importance to us whatever our 
usefulness to others.... All dimen- 
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sions of our life, including our plea- 
sure and pain, our enjoyment and 
suffering, our satisfaction and frus- 
tration, our continued existence or 
our untimely death-all make a dif- 
ference to the quality of our life. As 
the same is true of animals...they, 
too, must be viewed as the experi- 
encing subjects of a life with inher- 
ent value of their own" (Regan 1989, 
pp. 111-112). Consequently, any 
attribution of moral concern based 
on inherent value should extend to 
all animals. 
Each of these philosophers recog- 
nizes that at least some animals have 
interests and that this is sufficient 
reason to extend the circle of moral 
concern beyond humans alone. In- 
terests are considered by Rollin 
(1992) to involve "needs" and "de- 
sires," by Singer (1989, 1993) to be 
linked to a capacity to experience 
and to feel desires and have goals, 
and by Regan (1989) to be conse- 
quent to one's being "the subject of 
a life." Our purpose here is not to 
choose the best or most convincing 
of the arguments, but rather to point 
out that a general acceptance of the 
existence of "interests" can lead to a 
recognition of moral concern and 
consequent duties. 
The existence of a human respon- 
sibility toward animals leaves open 
the question of the kinds of duties 
attending this responsibility. Paral- 
lels between human and animal in- 
terests suggest that any minimal set 
of duties owed by humans to ani- 
mals might be similar to those owed 
to other humans. Because humans 
readily accept the value of a human 
life and the significance of pleasure 
and pain (or suffering), we might 
suppose that any set of duties owed 
to animals must include not causing 
them unnecessary death or suffer- 
ing. 
Such a position is philosophically 
supportable in several ways. One 
might argue, for example, as Rollin 
does, that "if being alive is the basis 
for being a moral object, and if all 
other interests and deeds are predi- 
cated upon life, then the most basic, 
morally relevant aspect of a creature 
is its life" (Rollin 1992, p. 84). Con- 
sequently it would seem that the 
most important duty owed a being 
worthy of moral concern is to not 
cause its death unnecessarily. Fur- 
ther, Rollin considers the capacity 
for the experience of pleasure and 
pain to be involved in the attribution 
of moral concern and to underlie 
many examples of interests that can 
be helped or hindered by other moral 
agents. If it is immoral to cause a 
human unnecessary suffering, so 
should it be in the case of an animal. 
Alternatively, one might base a 
description of the appropriate treat- 
ment of beings worthy of moral con- 
cern on utilitarian arguments, in 
which the best action is one that 
maximizes aggregate good. Such an 
approach is adopted by Singer. In 
some of his earlier works, he em- 
ploys a theory of "hedonistic utili- 
tarianism," in which "good" refers 
to happiness that is based on the 
experience of pleasure and the ab- 
sence of pain (Singer 1975). The 
morally best actions are those that 
maximize pleasure and minimize 
pain, whereas actions that cause 
unnecessary suffering are considered 
wrong. 
Singer also uses "preference utili- 
tarianism," in which "good" refers 
to the maximal satisfaction of pref- 
erences, in his consideration of the 
ethical implications of killing ani- 
mals (Singer 1993). He considers the 
painless killing of self-conscious be- 
ings with future-oriented desires and 
intentions to be wrong because death 
precludes the possibility of the satis- 
faction of these desires. However, 
this position can extend only to those 
beings possessing cognitive faculties 
allowing self-consciousness and the 
generation of future-directed prefer- 
ences and interests. Singer is some- 
what equivocal about which ani- 
mals meet this criterion. He is sure 
that humans, great apes, whales, 
dolphins, dogs, and other higher 
mammals are included, but is less 
confident in the case of cattle, sheep, 
seals, and so on. The case of fish and 
birds is even more problematic. The 
issue is a complex one and remains 
unresolved. What is important for 
this article, however, is that most 
releases from captivity involve ei- 
ther primates, cetaceans, or ca- 
nines, animals that are clearly ca- 
pable of the kind of thought 
distinguished by Singer. The case 
of birds, the other kind of animal 
regularly considered for release, 
needs further investigation. 
Singer (1993) also uses preference 
utilitarianism to counter the view 
that animals are in some sense re- 
placeable; that is, that it is morally 
reasonable to painlessly kill an indi- 
vidual if that individual will be re- 
placed by an equally "happy" one. 
Whereas a hedonistic utilitarian 
might reach this conclusion, prefer- 
ence utilitarianism must take account 
of the future, unsatisfied interests of 
the individual that has been killed, 
necessarily concluding that the kill- 
ing was ethically unjustifiable, at 
least in the case of self-conscious 
beings having significant future in- 
terests and preferences. 
The ethical relevance of duties 
accounting for the value of life and 
the significance of pleasure and pain 
might also be premised on the exist- 
ence of certain inviolable rights. 
Regan (1989), for example, holds 
that all individuals worthy of moral 
concern have such rights. He argues 
that no individual should be harmed 
for the benefit of others, so that, for 
example, every human has a direct 
duty to not cause nontrivial pain to 
others and a correlative right to not 
be made to suffer. Regan considers 
that harm ought to be measured in 
terms of the degree of restriction 
imposed on an individual's capacity 
to form and satisfy desires. Death is 
always, then, the greatest harm that 
an individual can suffer, so that kill- 
ing another individual should be 
avoided in all but the most extreme 
circumstances (these circumstances 
are defined by Regan in terms of 
various ethical tests). If we accept 
that moral consideration should ex- 
tend to animals, then the rights to 
not be made to suffer or die unneces- 
sarily must also apply to animals as 
well as to humans. 
We find again that several differ- 
ent philosophical approaches lead 
to a similar conclusion: that hu- 
mans, as moral agents, have a re- 
sponsibility to not cause the unnec- 
essary suffering or death of an 
animal. This conclusion could be 
invalidated only by providing con- 
clusive reasons for differentiating 
between the moral standing of hu- 
mans and that of animals. 
How does this conclusion relate 
specifically to captive animals? We 
contend that humans accept a re- 
sponsibility to captive animals by 
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taking them into a situation in which 
they are made dependent (for sur- 
vival) on human care. Conditions in 
captivity often mean that an animal 
is unable to fulfill its own needs, and 
survival and other skills therefore 
deteriorate. The welfare of the ani- 
mal then becomes the responsibility 
of the caretaker, analogous to the 
responsibility of a parent toward his 
or her children. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to con- 
clude that caretakers of captive ani- 
mals are at the very least responsible 
for ensuring that an animal does not 
die or suffer unnecessarily and that 
this responsibility continues until 
there is evidence that the animal can 
survive on its own. Furthermore, 
just as a responsible parent should 
prepare a child for the time when she 
will be on her own, so we suggest 
that a responsible caretaker should 
adequately prepare (i.e., train and 
condition) any animal that is a can- 
didate for release into the wild. If 
there is evidence that the animal is 
unable, in the absence of human 
intervention, to survive without suf- 
fering, then the caretaker has a re- 
sponsibility to return the animal to 
captivity. Animals that are not re- 
leasable should be kept until such 
time as they either die naturally or 
require painless medical euthanasia 
to avoid acute suffering. In the light 
of the duty to avoid the unnecessary 
death of an animal, any justification 
of euthanasia by caretakers would 
need to be both compelling and 
framed in terms of the other duty of 
this minimal set. Euthanasia is not, 
then, in the absence of pain and 
suffering, a viable alternative for 
nonreleasable animals. 
Elements of a responsible 
release project 
Conditions at many captive facili- 
ties have improved dramatically over 
the last few decades, often allowing 
animals to live in relatively natural 
settings with social groups similar to 
those found in the wild. However, 
the confines of captivity and depen- 
dence of animals on humans to sat- 
isfy their needs still result in certain 
characteristics typical of long-term 
captive animals and captive-born 
individuals that are not shared by 
wild conspecifics. These character- 
istics encompass two main areas: the 
deterioration or absence of certain 
survival skills, and a tendency to 
interact with humans and to regard 
them as a reliable food source. 
Deterioration of survival skills 
comes about because the needs of 
captive animals are provided for in 
such a way that they do not need to 
use or practice these skills as they 
would in the wild. Readily available 
food provided on a scheduled basis 
precludes the use of foraging tech- 
niques. The confines of captivity limit 
the use of navigational skills and 
make predator avoidance unneces- 
sary. Enforced social groupings may 
not allow the full range of communi- 
cation and social skills required for 
acceptance into a wild social group. 
Animals are rarely allowed a normal 
movement range or the opportunity 
to engage in extensive aerobic ac- 
tivities, so that levels of aerobic fit- 
ness are sometimes lower in captive 
animals than in wild ones. 
Humans come to be associated 
with the provision of food, either 
through training practices that use 
food as positive reinforcement or 
daily feeding schedules in which no 
training is required but food is sup- 
plied. Further, captive animals be- 
come habituated to the presence of 
humans in close proximity and lose 
much of the natural wariness of hu- 
man activities that is often evident 
in wild animals. 
It is essential to address these 
consequences of captivity when plan- 
ning a release project. To achieve a 
successful release, an animal will 
likely need all of its natural skills. 
Furthermore, and insofar as a re- 
lease project is designed to reintro- 
duce an animal to distinctively wild 
conditions, a released animal should 
no longer seek interactions with hu- 
mans or associate them with food 
and protection. 
The scientific literature contains 
criteria for successful release and a 
variety of guidelines to help meet 
those criteria. (See, for example, Beck 
et al. 1994, Brill and Friedl 1993, 
Campbell 1980, Chivers 1991, 
Kleiman 1989, Kleiman et al. 1994, 
Ludwig and Mikolajczak 1985). A 
survey of the literature, in combina- 
tion with personal experience, sug- 
gest that the following elements are 
likely to enhance the chances of suc- 
cessful release and are necessary to 
measure the success of a release: 
* Careful selection of release candi- 
dates. Not all individuals will have 
an equal capacity for survival. This 
point will be discussed further be- 
low. 
* Retraining and the enhancement 
of foraging skills that may have de- 
teriorated in captivity. This will mean 
feeding predatory animals appropri- 
ate live prey or supplying natural 
vegetation for herbivores. An ani- 
mal should not be released until it 
proves that it can secure and con- 
sume appropriate food items. (Ad- 
herence to this guideline is not ethi- 
cally neutral; the feeding of live prey 
raises difficult questions. However, 
following Singer's aforementioned 
distinction between the killing of 
those animals capable of future- 
oriented desires and those incapable 
of them, and noting that live prey 
come predominantly from the latter 
class whereas release candidates tend 
to come from the former, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the death 
of live prey is justifiable in the case 
of retraining.) 
* De-emphasis of human interac- 
tion. This includes an end to trained 
behaviors other than those needed 
for husbandry care. Feeding sessions 
should involve minimal interaction, 
preferably with the placement of 
proper foraging items in the animal's 
enclosure. All other types of human 
interaction should cease. Animals 
should no longer look to humans as 
a source of food or social interac- 
tion. Familiarity with the presence 
of humans should be discouraged by 
limiting the presence of humans in 
the captive enclosure. 
* Increase in aerobic fitness (if nec- 
essary). This will depend on the spe- 
cies, its normal ranging patterns, 
and the degree of confinement in 
captivity, which might have led to a 
reduction in fitness level. 
* Opportunity to practice naviga- 
tional skills. This can be accom- 
plished by movement to a larger 
enclosure equipped with natural veg- 
etation and terrain similar to that 
found at the release site or by "ex- 
cursions" into such terrain. 
* Selection of an appropriate release 
site. The preferable location would 
be one in which the animal was 
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initially captured or, if it was born 
in captivity, where its closest rela- 
tives were captured. Releasing an 
animal into an historically unfamil- 
iar area may reduce its chances of 
acceptance into the social group and 
its ability to cope with climatic con- 
ditions and local food resources. 
Populations may vary both physi- 
cally and behaviorally in different, 
geographically isolated areas. For 
example, although all bottlenose 
dolphins live in the ocean, there are 
regional differences in habitat struc- 
ture, food sources, and climatic char- 
acteristics. These elements result in 
regional differences in dolphin for- 
aging tactics, prey species, and mor- 
phology. Basic requirements for the 
selected release site should include 
the presence of conspecifics, suffi- 
cient resources, and a suitable cli- 
mate. 
* Examination of information on 
the species in the wild, preferably 
from studies of wild populations. 
These data can supply information 
on food sources, wild social behav- 
ior, ranging patterns, and group dy- 
namics. Such information might be 
useful in selecting the appropriate 
time of year for release and will aid 
in setting criteria for deciding 
whether or not a released animal has 
integrated properly into a wild popu- 
lation. 
* Health monitoring throughout the 
rehabilitation process and release. 
This is necessary to ensure that the 
animal's welfare is maintained. It 
will also serve as a basis for deter- 
mining whether or not an animal is 
adapting adequately to the wild. For 
example, it serves as baseline data 
for evidence of stress or loss of con- 
dition. Discussions of veterinary 
considerations and disease risks as- 
sociated with reintroduction can be 
found in Woodford and Kock (1991) 
and Woodford and Rossiter (1992). 
* Preparation for a gentle release. 
This entails relocating the released 
animal to an appropriate enclosure 
in the vicinity of the release site for 
a period of acclimation to the habi- 
tat, climate, and photoperiod. The 
enclosure will preferably be able to 
be opened to allow the animal free 
access in the initial release period 
and to act as a "home base" for the 
animal to return to for shelter. Fur- 
ther means of "softening" release 
include supplementing food sources 
using forage that can be found lo- 
cally. Such provision allows for 
gradual acclimation; to ease the ani- 
mal into the wild and away from 
human care with minimal stress. 
* Postrelease monitoring. Monitor- 
ing will indicate whether or not the 
individual is exhibiting a natural 
activity pattern and integrating into 
the environment. It will also inform 
the caretaker of an animal's inabil- 
ity to cope and can aid in the loca- 
tion of an individual if recapture is 
required. Without follow-up moni- 
toring there is no way of assessing 
the success or otherwise of a release. 
Postrelease monitoring is essential 
for determining whether or not the 
caretakers' responsibility to ensure 
an animal's survival has been met. 
* Planning of alternatives. Criteria 
must be set beforehand to determine 
when the release will be considered 
successful and under what condi- 
tions an animal will be recaptured 
and returned to captivity. An alter- 
native plan for the recapture and 
maintenance of the individual must 
be prepared. In this case, the animal 
will again be the responsibility of 
the caretaker, either until it can be 
released successfully or, if this is not 
possible, indefinitely. If further re- 
lease attempts are planned for the 
animal, criteria must be established 
to decide when an end should be put 
to release efforts and the decision 
made to retain the individual in cap- 
tivity. 
* Economic feasibility. If there are 
insufficient resources to ensure the 
provision of all the elements essen- 
tial for a successful release, then 
release might not be the best option. 
Resources that would otherwise be 
spent on a release project might be 
better spent improving the condi- 
tions of captive animals. A review of 
the costs incurred in a reintroduc- 
tion project is provided by Kleiman 
et al. (1991). 
Selection of candidates 
for release 
The selection of appropriate candi- 
dates for release is important for 
two reasons. Not only is it necessary 
to determine the likelihood of a par- 
ticular animal's capacity to adapt to 
the wild environment for its own 
welfare, but the release of an inap- 
propriate animal might endanger the 
wild population. The latter is pos- 
sible under two circumstances: first, 
if the released individual originally 
comes from a different locale and 
genetic stock from that of the popu- 
lation of animals at the release site; 
and second, if a released animal is a 
carrier of a disease not commonly 
found in the wild (it is also possible 
that a released individual might con- 
tract in the wild a disease to which it 
would not have been exposed in 
captivity, and to which it has no 
resistance; Woodford and Rossiter 
1992). 
We have already suggested that 
humans have responsibilities to ani- 
mals and that two of these are a duty 
to not cause animals unnecessary 
suffering or death. If an animal was 
to harm the genetic strength of the 
wild animals or if it was released 
from captivity with some disease not 
indigenous to the wild population, 
then these responsibilities will have 
been neglected. Neither Rollin's con- 
sideration of the value of life, nor 
Singer's utilitarianism, nor Regan's 
understanding of animal rights pro- 
vides any justification for privileg- 
ing the freedom of an individual 
over the ongoing survival and wel- 
fare of the wild population. 
The second reason to select ap- 
propriate release candidates has to 
do with the individuality of animals. 
The reasoning applied to the ethical 
consideration of individual animals 
on the one hand and groups of ani- 
mals on the other is not strictly in- 
terchangeable. What, then, is the 
caretaker's ethical responsibility to 
treat each animal as an individual 
with a unique history and circum- 
stances? The answer to this question 
might help to determine whether 
some individual animals are good 
candidates for release, whereas oth- 
ers should not be released under any 
circumstances. 
There might be good reasons for 
discriminating between individuals 
and deciding on different treatment 
based on the individual's circum- 
stances, capacities, or specific inter- 
ests. When applied to the selection 
of animals for release, this means 
that all of the animals should be 
considered equally but it does not 
guarantee that all will be released or 
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all kept in captivity. For example, 
the ability to survive in the wild 
might well vary from one animal 
to another depending on the 
individual's life history, capacity for 
training, medical history, "person- 
ality," length of time in captivity, 
opportunity for social interaction 
with conspecifics, and foraging and 
navigational skills. 
The scientific literature on past 
release projects suggests the mortal- 
ity rate of released animals to be 
high (Beck et al. 1991, 1994, Kleiman 
et al. 1984) and correlated to such 
factors as captive birth and a lengthy 
period as a captive. An animal born 
in captivity is unlikely to have devel- 
oped foraging tactics and naviga- 
tional skills, and a long-term captive 
could have a reduced capacity for 
regaining and refining survival skills. 
Individuals that are not properly 
prepared have a higher chance of 
suffering stress and losing condi- 
tion, so that such animals cannot be 
considered to have the same chance 
of survival as a short-term captive 
animal born in the wild. Conse- 
quently, to meet ethical responsi- 
bilities, the caretaker must discrimi- 
nate between such groups of animals 
both in selecting candidates for re- 
lease and in executing the rehabili- 
tation. The caretaker should never 
presume that a released animal will 
cope "somehow." Criteria have al- 
ready been established in the litera- 
ture for the selection of release can- 
didates (e.g., Brill and Friedl 1993, 
Kleiman et al. 1994). Individual ani- 
mals that fail to meet such criteria 
are likely to suffer and perhaps die. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that humans have 
certain moral duties toward animals. 
In the case of captives, these duties 
include providing for their needs and 
maintaining their welfare. When re- 
lease of animals into the wild is 
proposed, it is the responsibility of 
the caretaker to ensure that each 
animal has the skills and behaviors 
necessary for survival. This respon- 
sibility does not end until the animal 
has properly integrated into the wild 
population and no longer requires or 
seeks human care and attention. 
A variety of release projects has 
demonstrated certain guidelines and 
protocols that increase an individual 
animal's chances of survival. Some 
of these are: retraining skills, selec- 
tion of an appropriate release site, 
postrelease monitoring, and recap- 
ture of individuals unable to cope 
without human care. The selection 
of candidates for release deserves 
special attention. Not all animals 
will have the same chance of recov- 
ering appropriate wild behaviors; 
although all animals should be given 
equal consideration, not all should 
be released. 
Although release is a means of 
providing captive animals the op- 
portunity to live freely in a natural 
habitat, it can also lead to increased 
suffering and stress or even death. If 
caretakers are to uphold their duties 
to captive animals, release programs 
must be carefully and responsibly 
planned and managed with special 
attention to the elements described 
herein. If this is impossible for finan- 
cial or other reasons, then the pro- 
posed release must be deemed un- 
ethical and, for the welfare of the 
animals involved, should not pro- 
ceed. 
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